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Suggestions that there exists a need for reform of the law relating to sales 
of goods and services to consumers have been made from time to time over 
recent years in New Zealand. It has been said that the remedies available 
under the Sale of Goods Act 1908 are out of date and largely ineffective 
and inappropriate for the needs of modem consumers.' No general legis- 
lation exists to impose any liability on the manufacturers or importers of 
products which proved to be ineffective. New Zealand has been described 
as having "fallen behind comparable  jurisdiction^"^ in this area. 
The law of products liability has remained undeveloped. The Torts and 
General Law Reform Committee took the view in 1974 that once the 
statutory scheme for accident compensation in New Zealand was estab- 
lished, there would be no need for any legislative modification of the law 
governing products liability in New Zealand. In the field of property 
damage, the Committee considered that the widespread practice of loss 
insurance left only a very small residual area where a consumer might have 
to bear his or her own loss.3 
In 1977 the Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee of the 
Department of Justice produced a Working Paper on Warranties in Sales 
of Consumer Goods4 which proposed that the distinction between condi- 
tions and warranties in contracts for the sale of goods should be abolished 
and replaced with a single concept of warranty, with an associated new 
regime of remedies. No legislation was enacted on the basis of the report 
however, and the matter was again left for further review. 
In 1986 a further report was prepared by Professor D H Vernon of the 
University of Iowa for the New Zealand government which was concerned 
to investigate the direction whichshould be taken in the law relating to the 
supply of goods and services to consumers. Consideration was being given 
at the time to the question of whether or not, in the light of the existence 
of the CER agreement between New Zealand and Australia, the law on the 
subject ought to be the same in both countries and, if not, what would be 
an appropriate statutory scheme for New Zealand. The Vernon Report 
adopted the view that, although New Zealand's Fair Trading Act 1986, 
which deals with misleading conduct and unfair practices in trade, was 
modelled largely on Division 1 of Part V of the Australian Trade Practices 
Act 1974, Divisions 2 and 2A ofthat legislation, which deal with the rights 
of consumers against suppliers and manufacturers of defective goods and 
* This article was presented as apaper at the Australasian Law Teachers' Association Conference 
in Brisbane in July 1992. 
- 
I See, for example, the remarks by the Minister of Justice, the Rt Hon Geoffrey Palmer and the 
Minister of Consumer Affairs, the Hon Margaret Shields in their foreword to the renort An 
Outline for Post-Sale Consumer  egisl la ti on b New Zealand bv Professor David H ternon. 
1987, Wellington (the Vernon rePo$). 
2 Ibid. 
3 Products Liability, a report to the Minister of Justice, Wellington, March 1974 
4 1977, Wellington. 
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services, should not be adopted in New Zealand. Professor Vernon pro- 
posed a quite different regime, based on the creation of Statutory Codes 
of Responsible PracticesS5 Again, no legislation followed this report, 
although the then Ministers of Justice and of Consumer Affairs both 
considered the report to be "an outline of an original and exciting form of 
consumer pr~tection".~ 
In April of 1992, the Consumer Guarantees Bill was introduced into the 
New Zealand Parliament. It establishes a number of statutory guarantees 
with respect to the supply of goods and services and confers on consumers 
the rights to take action for non-compliance with the guarantees against 
suppliers and, in some cases, manufacturers. A new set of remedies is 
created and significant changes are made to other contractual legislation, 
including the Sale of Goods Act 1908 and the Contractual Remedies Act 
1979. The appearance of this Bill indicates that the possibility of harmo- 
nising the legislation of New Zealand and Australia with respect to 
consumer rights and remedies in relation to defective goods and services 
has been rejected. The Bill is drawn from a variety of sources and 
represents an amalgam of provisions from such legislation as the Con- 
sumer Products Warranties Act 1977 (Sask), the Supply of Goods and 
Services Act 1982 (UK), the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Aust) and various 
existing statutory provisions in force in New Zealand. Some provisions 
are quite new. 
The Bill is expressed not to be a code and the rights and remedies 
provided in it are in addition to any other right or remedy existing under 
any other Act or rule of law unless the right or remedy is expressly or 
impliedly repealed or modified by the Bill.7 Consequently, it will exist side 
by side with the other legislation respecting the law relating to consumers 
such as the Fair Trading Act. 
The right to contract out of the Bill's provisions is very limited. With 
the exception of the guarantee imposed on manufacturers with respect to 
the availability of repair facilities and spare parts,* and the case of "busi- 
ness  transaction^",^ it is not possible to avoid the imposition of the 
statutory guarantees.1° It is an offence against s 13(i) of the Fair Trading 
Act for a supplier or manufacturer to purport to contract out of the Bill 
other than in accordance with those provisions which permit it." Clause 
42(1) of the Bill states that the provisions of the Act "shall have effect 
notwithstanding any provision to the contrary in any agreement". 
The courts in Saskatchewan have considered the question of contracting 
out in the context of the Consumer Products Warranties Act. In two cases12 
goods were sold "as is", an expression generally taken to mean that "the 
See D J Harland: Post-Sale Consumer Legislation for New Zealand A Discussion of the Report 
to the Minister of Justice by Professor David H Vernon (1988) 3 Canta LR 410 for an outline 
and anal sis of the report. 
See the &reword to the report. 
Cl4(1). 
C141. 
C1 42 allows contracting out in the case of an agreement in writing made behveen a supplier 
and a consumer who acquires goods or services for the purposes of a business. As a person who 
acquires goods for resupplying them in trade or consuming them in the process of production 
or manufacture or repairing or treating other goods or fixtures is not a consumer within the 
definition in cl 2, the "business transaction" referred to must ap ly to such cases as, for 
example, the acquisition of a kettle (an item ordinarily acquired k r  personal, domestic or 
household use) by a factory owner to enable his or her staff to make coffee. 
CI 42. 
Cl42(4). 
MacLeod v Ens (1982) 15 Sask R 75 and Adams v J &  D's Used Cars Ltd (1983) 26 Sask R 40. 
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product is bought and sold in the condition in which it then exists, for better 
or for worse, with altogether no warranties in relation to quality, durability 
or fitness, and with the entire risk in those respects to be borne by the 
buyer".13 It was held that the existence of the statutory warranties in the 
legislation could not be ousted by the use of the words "as is"; and the 
agreement should be treated as though the parties had never used the 
expression, it being of no legal effect whatsoever. It was also held that not 
only could the phrase "as is" not touch the existence of the warranties, 
but, also, it could not affect their extent by affecting the description of the 
product sold or amounting to a circumstance of the sale.14 The Saskatche- 
wan Act is more detailed in its drafting with respect to the matter of 
contracting out than is the new Bill, but it would seem likely that the New 
Zealand courts would take a similar approach, given the apparently abso- 
lute prohibition on contracting out contained in cl42(1). 
The Bill is not to derogate from any other law which imposes stricter 
duties on supp1iersI5 or any law which implies terms not inconsistent with 
the Bill into contracts for the supply of services.I6 Any legislation defining 
or restricting the rights, duties or liabilities arising in connection with a 
service or any description is not to be limited or affected by the Bill;17 and 
nor is the law relating to contracts of employment or apprenticeship.18 The 
barrister's immunity from suit is preserved.19 
The legislation applies to the supply of goods or services to consumers. 
A consumer is a person who acquires from a supplier goods or services of 
a kind ordinarily acquired for personal, domestic, or household use or 
consumption, and not for the purpose of resupplying them in trade, 
consuming them in the course of a process of production or manufacture 
or repairing or treating in trade other goods or fixtures on land. A supplier 
must supply the goods or services in trade for the Bill to be applicable to 
him or her;2O "trade" is defined sufficiently widely to include any busi- 
ness, profession, commercial activity or undertaking relating to the supply 
or acquisition of goods or services.21 
The Bill is not limited to the sale of goods, but applies to their supply, 
which means the supply by way of gift, sale, exchange, lease, hire or hire 
purchase.22 This means that there is no need to find that a contract between 
supplier and consumer exists; the guarantees are imposed by the legislation 
whenever a supply within its terms occurs. There is no extensive definition 
of "goods" in the Bill, but it is provided that "goods" includes goods 
which are attached to, or incorporated in, any real or personal property.23 
The provisions of the Bill do not apply, however, where goods are supplied 
by auction or by competitive tender.24 
See MacLeod v Ens above n 12 at 76 
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The obligations on the supplier of goods are imposed whether or not the 
goods are supplied in connection with a service,25 so that a contract for 
work and materials is subject to the same requirements, as far as the 
materials component of the contract is concerned, as are simple transac- 
tions for the supply of goods alone. This reflects the position which had 
been reached by the common law, for the courts had taken the view that 
the obligations on the supplier of goods should not differ according to 
whether an element of service was also involved in the contract.26 Conse- 
quently, the guarantees imposed by the Bill on suppliers and manufacturers 
with respect to goods must be complied with even if the provision of the 
goods forms only a small proportion of the total consideration provided 
under the contract, the other, perhaps substantial, part of the consideration 
being for the supply of a service, such as installation of the goods. 
No mention of second hand goods occurs in the Bill which means that 
the guarantees will apply to them provided the transaction in question 
otherwise comes within the provisions of the Bill. No doubt the fact that 
goods are second hand will be a factor in considering the extent of a 
particular guarantee and the standard which must be met, as is the case 
under the Sale of Goods 
Guarantees as to title 
Where goods are supplied to a consumer, guarantees are provided in cl 
5(1) of the Bill that (a) the supplier has a right to sell the goods and (b) that 
the goods are free from any undisclosed security and (c) that the consumer 
has the right to undisturbed possession of the goods, except in so far as 
that right is varied pursuant to a term in a hire purchase agreement or a 
security or term of the agreement for supply in respect of which the 
consumer has received oral advice as to the way in which his or her right 
to undisturbed possession of the goods could be affected and also a written 
copy of the relevant part of the agreement for supply or security. The 
reference to a "right to sell" goods means a right to dispose of the 
ownership of the goods to the consumer at the time when that ownership 
is to pass.28 In the case of a hire or lease, only the guarantee in (c) is 
a p p l i ~ a b l e , ~ ~  and that only for the period of the hire or lease.30 Where goods 
fail to comply with any guarantee under clause 5, there exists a right of 
redress against the s ~ p p l i e r . ~ ~  
This provision replaces s 14 of the Sale of Goods Act 1908, which deals 
with similar implied undertakings and that section is expressed to be 
inapplicable to any supply of goods to which the new Bill relates.32 Under 
s 14 of the Sale of Goods Act, the right to sell is an implied condition on 
the part of the seller, and the terms as to quiet possession and freedom from 
any undisclosed charge or encumbrance are warranties. The distinction 
between conditions and warranties is no longer applicable in the case of 
the Consumer Guarantees Bill, and, if any of the guarantees implied by cl 
5 are not complied with, the remedies available are those provided by the 
Bill. 
25 c115. 
26 See Young & Marten Ltd v McManus Childs Ltd 119691 1 AC 454. 
27 See, for example, Bartlett v Sidney Marcus Ltd El9651 2 All ER 753. 
28 C1 512'1. 
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The guarantees provided in cl 5 are based on those provided in s 14 of 
the Sale of Goods Act and s 1 1 of the Hire Purchase Act 1971, and the 
guarantees, are, mutatis mutandis, similar in substance to the conditions 
and warranties set out in those Acts. However, both the Sale of Goods Act 
and the Hire Purchase Act provide that the purchaser "shall" enjoy quiet 
possession of the goods;33 the new Bill provides a guarantee that the 
consumer "has the right to undisturbed possession" of the goods. It has 
been held that the use of the future tense in the Sale of Goods Act makes 
it clear that the provision is aimed at the future, so that the right to quiet 
possession exists not only at the time the sale is made, but extends forward 
into the time after title has passed from the seller to the buyer. In conse- 
quence, it has been possible for a buyer who has received a good title to 
goods at the time of the sale to complain of a breach of the warranty of 
quiet possession some considerable time later, although the circumstances 
giving rise to the breach did not exist at the time the sale was made and it 
was subsequent to the making of the sale that the interference with the 
buyer's right to quiet possession occurred.34 This conclusion was reached 
on the basis of an examination of the language of the provision. It is not 
clear whether the difference in tense employed in the new Bill will effect 
any change in the law. It may be argued that the concept of quiet possession 
necessarily looks to the future, regardless of whether a present or a future 
tense is used in the legislation. Against this, however, it may be noted that 
the right to quiet possession has been held to be a part of the implied 
condition of a right to sell, and as such may exist at the time of the sale 
rather than merely in the future.35 Although the new Bill limits the meaning 
of "right to sell" by defining it solely as a right to transfer ownership, so 
that the concept of quiet possession is not included in the right to sell, the 
reasoning that a right to quiet possession may exist at the time of the sale 
and not merely for the future, may still hold good. 
In a case where the goods supplied do not comply with the guarantee as 
to title, a supplier may be required to remedy the failure to comply by 
"curing any defect in title".36 This provision is not further defined or 
explained, but its meaning is, perhaps, that, a supplier who had no right to 
dispose of the ownership of the goods at the time ownership was to pass 
may "feed the title" by making any payment due or doing whatever may 
be necessary pursuant to a previous transaction which would have given 
him title to, or a right to transfer ownership of, the goods. The courts have 
held that a title can be fed in this way provided the act done by the seller 
of goods which feeds the title is carried out before the buyer rescinds the 
agreement made between him or her and the person from whom he 
purchased the goods so that the agreement is still on foota3' 
Guarantee as to acceptable quality 
The familiar condition of merchantable quality implied by s 16(b) of the 
Sale of Goods Act has been replaced by the requirement stated in cl 6 of 
the Bill that, where goods are supplied to a consumer, there is a guarantee 
that the goods are of acceptable quality. This phrase is drawn from the 
33 Ss l4(b) and 1 l(c) respectively. 
34 See Microbeads AC v Vinhurst Road Markings Ltd [I9751 1 WLR 218, [I9751 1 All ER 529. 
35 Ibid. 
\ -, --, 
37 See, for example, Butterworthv Kingsway Motors Ltd [I9541 1 WLR 1286 and Patten v Thomas 
Motors Pty Ltd [I9651 NSWR 1457. 
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Consumer Products Warranties Act 1977 ( S a ~ k ) ~ ~  although its definition 
is more detailed in the new Bill than in the Saskatchewan l eg i~ la t ion .~~  
Goods are of acceptable quality if they are as (a) fit for all the purposes 
for which goods of the type in question are commonly supplied, and (b) 
acceptable in appearance and finish, and (c) free from defects, and (d) safe, 
and (e) durable, as a reasonable consumer fully acquainted with the state 
and condition of the goods, including any hidden defects, would regard as 
acceptable, having regard to (f) the nature ofthe goods, (g) the price (where 
relevant), (h) any statements made about the goods on any packaging or 
label on the goods, (i) any representation made about the goods by the 
supplier or the manufacturer, and Cj) all other relevant circumstances of 
the supply of the goods.40 Where the defects in question have been 
specifically drawn to the consumers attention before the agreement was 
made, the goods will not fail to comply with the guarantee;41 and where 
goods are displayed for sale or hire, the only defects to be treated as having 
been specifically drawn to the consumer's attention are those disclosed on 
a written notice displayed with the goods.42 In any action under the new 
legislation, proof that the goods do not comply with Product Safety 
Standards set under Part I11 of the Fair Trading Act 1986 is prima facie 
evidence that the goods are not of acceptable quality, although proof that 
those standards are met is not to be prima facie evidence that the goods are 
of acceptable quality.43 
It is doubtful whether the definition of acceptable quality and the matters 
to be considered in deciding whether goods are of merchantable quality 
differ in any way from the equivalent matters relating to merchantable 
quality under the Sale of Goods Act. In interpreting the expression "mer- 
chantable quality", the courts have consistently considered those same 
factors which are spelled out in the new Bill with regard to acceptable 
quality. It may be that the relabelling of the concept is intended to shift the 
emphasis from the point of view of that of the seller to the consumer. A 
perception has existed that the concept of merchantable quality is related 
to the question of whether in fact goods are saleable; for example, in their 
foreword to the Vernon report, the Minister of Justice and the Minister of 
Consumer Affairs stated that the "very words 'merchantable quality' 
indicate that the [Sale of Goods] Act is not appropriate to consumer 
transactions. The one thing that the consumer does not want to do with a 
purchased item is to resell it "; a statement which, it can be argued, does 
not accurately reflect the established meaning of "merchantable quality", 
which refers to the state or condition of the goods, rather than whether they 
can be sold.44 
38 S 11. 
39 S 2(a) of the Consumer Products Warranties Act provides that "acceptable quality" means 
"the characteristics and the quality of a consumer product that consumers can reasonably expect 
the product to have, having regard to all the relevant circumstances of the sale of the product, 
including the description of the product, its purchase price and the express wwriuities of  the 
retail seller or manufacturer of the product, and includes merchantable quality within the 
meaning of The Sale of Goods Act ". 
40 c1 7(1). 
41 c1 7(2). 
42 c 1  7(3). 
43 C17(4). 
44 "...the condition is not that the goods shall be 'merchantable', but that they shall be of 
'merchantable quality'...": see Sumner Permain andCo v Webb andCo [I9221 1 KB 55, 60, 
per Bankes LJ. 
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Although the Saskatchewan Act defines "acceptable quality" in differ- 
ent terms from those found in the new Bill, it provides that the expression 
"includes merchantable quality within the meaning of the Sale of Goods 
an addition which enables the courts to take into account the 
detailed judicial deliberations and interpretations already in existence 
respecting the requirements as to quality in contracts for the sale of goods. 
No such link is provided in the new Bill, which contains no mention of the 
concept of merchantable quality. 
The Saskatchewan courts have considered the concept of acceptable 
quality in a number of cases, as well as the question of durability of goods, 
which is the subject of a separate warranty in the Saskatchewan The 
matters which the courts there have taken into account are essentially those 
which are included in the definition of "acceptable quality" in the New 
Zealand Bill. For example, it has been held that the contract description is 
relevant in that it affects the buyer's expectations as to what he will receive, 
even in the case of second hand goods. In Adams v J & D's Used Cars 
Ltd47 the court had to decide whether a second hand car, described as "a 
premium unit" and purchased for $2,500.00, in which defects, both major 
and minor, became apparent soon after the purchase was of acceptable 
quality. The court considered that because the car was represented as being 
6 L a premium unit", the buyer was entitled to assume it had a higher degree 
of acceptable and merchantable quality than the vehicle in fact proved to 
have with the result that the statutory warranty was breached and the buyer 
was entitled to damages to compensate for the major defects which 
constituted a breach of the warranty. Similarly, it was held48 that a satellite 
dish which was sold as being of top quality and which had cost $4,704.75 
was not of acceptable quality when it was shown to have a defective part 
which caused the buyer to be able to receive only four television channels 
instead of the ten or twelve which he expected to receive. The cost of 
purchasing and installing a new part was $400.00 and the part had to be 
replaced twice within ten months of the initial purchase of the dish. The 
court took the view that the buyer's reasonable expectations were not met. 
However, the court observed in Adams v J & D 's Used Cars Ltd that it 
was to be expected that "run of the mill repairs common to any used car'' 
should be anticipated, and the cost of rectifying such routine and predictable 
problems was not recoverable under the Act. This point was discussed in 
Weisbrod v Regina Motor Products (1970) Ltd,49 a case concerning a new 
van which developed a number of problems, three of which were serious, 
requiring the buyer to return it to the seller on 12 different occasions during 
the four years following the sale. The court took the view that a consumer 
could not expect a new motor vehicle to be totally free of all defects for an 
indefinite time, for that would be to expect perfection and "the standard for 
human behaviour is not perfection. Thus it is not possible merely to 
aggregate a series of minor routine repairs with three unrelated, although 
perhaps significant, problems and thereby label a perfectly usable motor 
vehicle as of unacceptable quality."50 By contrast, it was held5' that a second 
45 S 2(a). 
46 s 11. 
47 Above. 
48 Nestman v M &  HElectrical Contractors Lid (1987) 50 Sask R 233 
49 (1990) 79 Sask R 219. 
50 At 223, per Matheson J. 
5 I MacLedd v Ens above n 12 
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hand car, purchased for $850.00 did not meet the warranty of durability 
when a major mechanical problem costing $378.06 to repair developed 
three days after the date of purchase, when the buyer had travelled only 68 
miles. The court noted that it could occasionally be difficult to apply the 
warranty; "by definition it expands and contracts with circumstance and 
each case will fall to be decided on its own peculiar facts'',52 but the engine 
in the particular case should have lasted more than three days. 
No doubt the above cases will be of relevance in interpreting the new 
Bill. Although durability is not a separate guarantee in the Bill, durability 
is stated to be a factor to be considered in determining whether goods are 
or are not of acceptable quality.53 
Guarantees as to fitness for particular purpose 
Two guarantees are set out in cl 8 of the Bill. First, there is a guarantee 
that, where goods are supplied to a consumer, that they will be reasonably 
fit for any particular purpose that the consumer makes known, expressly 
or by implication, to the supplier as the purpose for which the goods are 
being acquired by the consumer;54 and second, that the goods are reason- 
ably fit for any particular purpose for which the supplier represents that 
they are or will be fit.55 The guarantees are inapplicable, however, where 
the circumstances show that the consumer does not rely on the supplier's 
skill or judgment,56 or where it is unreasonable for the consumer to rely on 
the supplier's skill or j~dgment.~ '  The guarantee applies whether or not the 
purpose is a purpose for which the goods are commonly supplied.5s 
This clause replaces s 16(a) of the Sale of Goods Act, which implies a 
condition as to fitness for purpose where the buyer, expressly or by 
implication, makes known to the seller the particular purpose for which 
the goods are required, so as to show that the buyer relies on the seller's 
skill or judgment. The words "so as to show" have been held to be 
significant; the mere fact of the buyer's making his or her purpose known 
to the seller does not in itself suffice to make the condition applicable, for 
the making known of the purpose must have the effect of indicating that 
reliance on the seller on the part of the buyer exists.59 So, if, for example, 
the parties are equally knowledgeable about the subject matter of the sale, 
reliance will not be inferred under the section.60 However, in the case of 
retail sales, the courts have indicated that reliance will readily be found, 
for reliance will seldom be express, and it may be inferred that a buyer 
goes to a shop in the confidence that the seller has selected his or her stock 
with skill and judgment.61 It also seems that, under s 16(a), because the 
"particular purpose" includes any general purpose for which the goods in 
question are commonly used,(j2 it is sufficient to bring s 16(a) into play if 
52 Ibid, p 80. 
53 Cl 7(l)(e). 
54 C1 8(11(a). 
57 CI 8(2j(bj. 
ss C1 8(3). 
59 See Feast Contractors Ltd v Ray Vincent Ltd ti9741 1 NZLR 2 12, which applied Henry Kendall 
& Sons v William Lillico & Sons Ltd 119691 2 AC 39. 
. * 
60 Ibid. 
61 See Grant v Australian Knitting Mills Ltd [I9361 AC 85, 99, per Lord Wright. 
62 "[Ilt is not necessary for the buyer expressly to communicate to the seller the fact that he desires 
the goods for that general purpose. The seller must be taken to know that, if nothing is said to 
the contrary, food is bought for the purpose of being eaten, and motor-cars for the purpose of 
loccmotion": Taylor v Combined Buyers Ltd [I9241 NZLR 627, 629, per Salmond J. 
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the seller is aware that the buyer might use the goods for the purpose for 
which they were in fact used.'j3 The effect of this is to impose a heavy 
burden on the seller, who will be liable under s 16(a) if the goods are not 
fit for any purpose within their possible range of uses, as well as for any 
additional expressly stated purpose, unless the use to which the buyer puts 
the goods is an unusual or abnormal one. 
It may be presumed that the new Rill is not intended to effect any 
diminution in the rights of consumers, and that the obligation on a seller 
should not be less than that under the Sale of Goods Act with respect to 
fitness for purpose of goods. It seems that the requirement as to reliance 
on the seller by the buyer is unchanged under the new Bill, for the 
guarantees do not apply if there is in fact no reliance by the consumer or 
if reliance is unreasonable. These two exceptions are expressed disjunc- 
tively, so presumably if a consumer has actually relied on a supplier, but 
it was unreasonable for the consumer so to rely, the supplier will not be 
liable. This probably represents the same position which exists under the 
Sale of Goods 
However, the question of the meaning of "particular purpose'' in cl 8 
is perhaps less clear. Clause 8(3) states that the guarantee is applicable 
whether or not the purpose is a purpose for which the goods are commonly 
supplied. Presumably, however, no guarantee would be imposed if the 
consumer did not make known to the seller any unusual or abnormal 
purpose for which the goods were required. It is not possible that a supplier 
could be liable for every possible conceivable use, no matter how idiosyn- 
cratic, which a consumer might make of goods. If the purpose were an 
unusual or abnormal one, it is therefore unlikely that this could be consid- 
ered to have been made known to the seller merely by implication, and so 
an express communication would be required. No doubt it may easily be 
inferred that a supplier is aware of any intended use which is one for which 
the goods are commonly supplied. The effect, therefore, of cl 8(3) is not 
readily apparent and it is difficult to see whether it alters the law with regard 
to the meaning of "particular purpose" as it has been defined under the 
Sale of Goods Act. 
Clause 8 adds, however, the additional provision that there is a guarantee 
imposed with respect to the reasonable fitness for any particular purpose 
for which the supplier represents that they are or will be fit. Section 16(a) 
of the Sale of Goods Act does not contain any such provision and no 
mention is made in that section of any representations made by the seller 
of goods. In practice, a representation by the seller that the goods are fit 
for a particular purpose would no doubt be linked with the buyer's making 
known the purpose for which the goods are required, so that it may make 
little difference whether the seller volunteers the information or supplies 
it in response to the buyer's disclosure of the purpose for which the latter 
requires the goods. In either case, an express statement by the seller would 
suffice to bring s 16(a) into play provided the buyer's intended purpose 
was disclosed. However, a gratuitous statement by the supplier of goods, 
unrelated to any disclosure made by the consumer as to the purpose for 
63 Lord Diplock dissented on this point in Ashington Piggeries Ltd v Christopher Hill Ltd [1972] 
AC 441,507. However, the majority ofthe House ofLords held that knowledge ofthe possibility 
that goods might be used in the way in which they were in fact used was sufficient to constitute 
knowledge of a "particular purpose". 
64 See, for example, the suggestion by Lord Pearce that reliance must be reasonable in Kendall v 
Lillico above n 59. 
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which the consumer wishes to acquire the goods might give rise to liability 
under cl 8 although no liability might have existed under s 16(a) if a 
consumer in fact used goods for the purpose for which the supplier stated 
they were fit, although the consumer neither had nor disclosed any inten- 
tion of making such use of the goods at the time of acquiring them. 
Guarantee that goods comply with description 
The guarantee as to compliance with description in cl 9 of the Bill is 
very similar in its terms to the condition implied by s 15 of the Sale of 
Goods Act, which is replaced by c l 9  in the case of the supply of goods to 
consumers. Clause 9 provides that a guarantee that, where goods are 
supplied by description to a consumer, the goods correspond with the 
de~cr ip t ion .~~  The fact that goods are selected by the consumer does not 
prevent the supply of goods from being a supply by de~cr ip t ion~~  and, if 
the goods are supplied by reference to a sample or demonstration model 
as well as by description, the guarantee in c l 9  is applicable as well as that 
imposed by cl 10, which requires compliance with sample.67 The clause 
uses the familiar terminology of "sale by description" and appears to 
differ little in substance from the requirements of s 15 of the Sale of Goods 
Act which provides that where there is a contract for the sale of goods by 
description there is an implied condition that the goods shall correspond 
with the description. 
It is well established in the context of the Sale of Goods Act that "the 
key to s [15] is identificati~n".~~ The section does not concern the quality 
of the goods, but their identity, so that any inquiry into whether goods 
comply with their description inevitably focuses on whether or not the 
goods are or are not of the kind which the buyer agreed to buy, and matters 
relating to inessential attributes of quality are dealt with under s. 16. It may 
be that c l 9  proves to be different in its effect from s 15, for c l2  l(b) of the 
new Bill, which concerns remedies, provides that there will be a failure of 
a substantial character to comply with c l9  where "the goods depart in one 
or more significant respects from the description by which they were 
supplied". This language suggests that the issue of compliance with 
description may no longer be dealt with by examining the question of the 
identity of the goods, but that the attributes of the goods may be examined 
as well. 
Guarantees that goods comply with sample 
Clause 10 of the Bill provides that where goods are supplied to a 
consumer by reference to a sample or demonstration model, there are 
implied the guarantees that the goods correspond with the sample or 
demonstration model in quality and that the consumer will have a reason- 
able opportunity to compare the goods with the sample.69 Goods which are 
supplied by reference to a sample or demonstration model as well as by 
description are subject to the guarantees found in both s 9 and s. This 
provision replaces s 17 of the Sale of Goods Act with respect to consumer 
sales, and does n . ~ c  appear to differ in substance from that section. 
65 c19(1). 
66 c19(2). 
67 c1 9(3). 
68 Clzristopher Hill Ltd v Ashington Piggeries above n 63 at 504, per Lord Diplock, followed in 
Finch Motors Ltd v Quinn (No 2) [I9801 NZLR 519. 
69 c1 lO(1). 
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The Saskatchewan Act is close in its wording to s 17 ofthe Sale of Goods 
Act with respect to the warranties which it implies into sales by sample. 
The Saskatchewan warranty was held to have been breached in Wagner's 
Flooring Ltd v Lischynski7', when a supplier laid a carpet in the home of 
a buyer who had selected the carpet by reference to a sample provided by 
the supplier. After installation, the carpet was found to have a backing 
different from that which was on the sample, with the result that the carpet 
supplied was less resilient and had a different feel from that of the sample, 
although no difference in appearance was readily discernible. It was held 
that the carpet supplied was a quite different one in quality, and the supplier 
was not entitled to any of the purchase price at all unless a carpet identical 
to the sample was installed by the supplier to replace the carpet which did 
not correspond with the sample. Presumably, the same result would be 
reached under cl 10 of the new Bill. 
Guarantee as to price 
Section 10 of the Sale of Goods Act provides that where the price of 
goods is not determined by contract or left to be fixed in an agreed manner 
or determined by the course of dealing between the parties, the buyer must 
pay a reasonable price. With respect to the supply of goods to consumers 
under the new Bill, cl 11 creates a guarantee as to price which is in 
effectively the same terms as s 10, and enables the buyer, where the 
guarantee is not complied with, to refuse to pay more than a reasonable 
Guarantee as to repairs and spare parts 
This guarantee is imposed only on the manufacturer of goods, and not 
on the supplier. Clause 12(1) of the Bill states that where goods are 
supplied to a consumer, there is a guarantee that the manufacturer will take 
reasonable action to ensure that facilities for repair ofthe goods and supply 
of parts for the goods are reasonably available for a reasonable period after 
the goods are first supplied to the consumer. 
This obligation is quite new in New Zealand. It is based on similar 
statutory obligations imposed in A ~ s t r a l i a ~ ~  and Sa~katchewan.~~ It was 
suggested in the Vernon report that "the extent of nonavailability of spare 
parts is somewhat unique to Nkw Zealand because of its geographic 
remoteness and because the limited market demands generated by its 
relatively small population discourage manufacturing within New Zealand 
of goods that require large capital  investment^".'^ Professor Vernon 
recommended that information about the availability of spare parts should 
be given to consumers, and that suppliers should be required to ensure a 
supply of spare parts throughout the "ordinary useful life" of the item.76 
Rather than attempting to lay down any particular requirement of this 
kind, cl 12 uses the criterion of reasonableness; facilities for repair and 
supply of parts must be "reasonably available for a reasonable period after 
the goods are first supplied to the consumer". No doubt the expected life 
of goods would be a factor in considering what is a reasonable period for 
which repair facilities and parts should be available. The clause is succinct 
71 (1987) 54 Sask R 225. 
72 c1  11(2). 
73 Trade Practices Act 1974, s 74F(1). 
74 Consumer Products Warranties Act 1977, s 1 l(8). 
75 Above n 1 at 21. 
76 Ibid. 
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in its terms, and does not contain the detail to be found in the equivalent 
Australian legislation which provides that a court should have regard to 
all the circumstances of the case and in particular, to the existence of 
circumstances beyond the control of the supplier that prevented repair 
facilities or parts being so available.77 No such provision is to be found in 
the new Bill. 
It is possible to contract out of this guarantee, for it does not apply where 
reasonable action is taken to notify the consumer who first acquires the 
goods from a supplier, at or before the time the goods are supplied, that 
manufacturer does not undertake that repair facilities and parts will be 
available, or that they will be available for only a specified period. 
Presumably, it is the responsibility of the manufacturer to so notify the 
consumer. As the consumer will not ordinarily have contact with the 
manufacturer in the retail situation, such notification would have to take 
place by means of documentation accompanying the goods, or by adver- 
tisements of some kind. 
A contract for the provision of goods to be installed in a building or 
structure is usually regarded as a contract for labour and materials rather 
than as a sale of goods.78 However, the law has moved towards the position, 
in the case of contracts which are for work and materials, of imposing the 
same obligations on the provider of the goods and materials with respect 
to the goods supplied as would have been applicable had the contract been 
one for the supply of goods alone. The liability of the supplier of goods 
should not be different according to whether or not the goods are installed 
or worked on in same way by the supplier.79 The new Bill confirms this 
principle, and the guarantees respecting the supply of goods are applicable 
whether or not the goods are supplied in connection with a service.80 
However, the Bill goes further and sets out a scheme of guarantees and 
remedies with respect to the provision of services, which apply whether 
or not goods are supplied in conjunction with the service. 
Clause 28 is in simple terms; it states that where services are supplied 
to a consumer there is a guarantee that the service will be carried out with 
due care and skill. The word "due" is that adopted in Australia in s 74(1) 
of the Trade Practices Act 1974; it may be contrasted with the equivalent 
United Kingdom provision, which requires "reasonable" care and skill 
on the part of a s ~ p p l i e r . ~ ~  It may be that the use of the word "due" instead 
of "reasonable" imposes a higher duty than that imposed by the law of 
n e g l i g e n ~ e . ~ ~  However, this is not clear, and it cannot be said with any 
certainty that cl 28 does more than state the existing law. 
Although cl 29 is based on s 74(2) of the Trade Practices Act, it is not 
identical in its provisions. The clause imposes a guarantee that, where 
services are supplied to a consumer the service, and any product resulting 
from the service, will be reasonably fit for any particular purpose, and of 
such a nature and quality that it can reasonably be expected to achieve any 
particular result that the consumer makes known to the supplier as the 
77 Trade Practices Act 1974, s 74F(4). 
78 See Atiyah, The Sale of Goods, 8th edition. 
79 See Young & Marten Ltd v McMunus Childs Ltd [I9691 1 AC 454. 
so C1 15. 
81 Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982 (UK), s 13. 
82 See Woodroffe, Goods and Services -The New Law, Sweet & Maxwell, 1982 p 104. 
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particular purpose for which the service is required or the result that the 
consumer desires to achieve, except where the circumstances show that 
the consumer does not rely on the supplier's skill or judgment or it 
unreasonable for the consumer to do so. 
The requirement that any product resulting from the service must be 
reasonably fit for its purpose is not found in s 74 (2) of the Trade Practices 
Act, which refers to the services supplied and "any materials supplied in 
connexion with those services". As the guarantees in the new Bill respect- 
ing the supply of goods refers to goods supplied under the agreement rather 
than resulting from a supplier's services, this guarantee is new. It may be 
that the guarantee as to fitness for purpose of any product resulting from 
the service would be included in the guarantee as to due care and skill in 
c l28 in any event, but cl29 makes this explicit. 
A guarantee as to time of completion is provided in cl 30, which is 
essentially the same as that to be found in the Supply of Goods and Services 
Act 1982 (UK). Where services are supplied to a consumer, there is a 
guarantee that the service will be completed within a reasonable time if 
the time for the service to be carried out is not fixed by the contract, left 
to be fixed in a manner agreed by the contract or determined by the course 
of dealing between the parties. A guarantee as to price to be paid to a 
supplier for services is found in cl. 3 1; its terms are similar to those of cl 
30, with the result that the amount payable for both goods and services is 
required to be "reasonable", unless the parties have agreed on the price 
or a mechanism to fix the price themselves. 
IV. RIGHTS OF REDRESS AGAINST SUPPLIERS 
A scheme of remedies for a consumer against a supplier who has failed 
to comply with the guarantees imposed is set out in the new Bill. The effect 
of this scheme is far reaching, for it replaces, as far as consumer sales of 
goods are concerned, the long established regime to be found in the Sale 
of Goods Act. Under the Sale of Goods Act, it is necessary to consider the 
remedies available in the light of the classification of terms of contracts 
for the sale of goods i.nto conditions and warranties, the remedies available 
depending on the classification. A breach of a condition, being a term going 
to the root of the contract or of the essence of a contract, gives rise to a 
right to rescind on the part of the innocent party; a breach of a warranty, a 
term collateral to the main purpose of the contract, entitles the innocent 
party to damages but not to any right to rescind. This well established 
dichotomy will no longer apply to sales to which the Bill relates.83 Instead, 
the Bill gives the consumer options against a supplier who has not 
complied with the statutory  guarantee^.^^ 
In essence, the scheme laid down is that, where the failure to comply 
with the guarantee can be remedied, the consumer may require the supplier 
to remedy the failure within a reasonable time,85 which means repairing 
the goods or curing any defect in title, or replacing the goods with goods 
of identical type.86 If the supplier refuses or neglects to do so, or does not 
succeed in doing so within a reasonable time, the consumer may have the 
83 A news 56A is inserted into the Sale of Goods Act by cl47 ofthe Bill: "Nothing in section 10 
or in sections 13 to 17 or in section 38 or in section 54 of this Act shall apply to any supply of 
goods to which the Consumer Guarantees Act 1992 applies." 
84 C1 18. 
85 C1 18(2)(a). 
86 c1 19(1). 
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failure remedied elsewhere and obtain from the supplier all reasonable 
costs incurred in having the failure remedied or reject the goods.87 Where 
the failure cannot be remedied or is of a "substantial cha ra~ te r" ,~~  the 
consumer may reject the goods or obtain compensation from the supplier 
for any reduction in the value of the goods below their purchase price.89 
It seems that any expectation that a consumer may have as to a right to 
reject the goods must be a realistic one, or the courts may consider that the 
continuation of an action by the consumer is frivolous and vexatious. In 
Weisbrod v Regina Motor Products (1970) Ltd,90 a breach of a statutory 
warranty which occurred more than four years after the purchase of the 
goods was a remediable one, and the supplier had offered to remedy the 
breach. It was held that any expectation of rejection of the contract by the 
consumer was totally unrealistic, and the consumer's continuation of the 
action was therefore frivolous, a finding which was reflected in the award 
as to costs which was made. 
The right to reject the goods is exercised by notifying the supplier of the 
decision to reject and the grounds of reje~tion.~'  The consumer must return 
the rejected goods to the supplier unless the failure to comply with the 
guarantee or the size or height or method of attachment of the goods makes 
the cost to the consumer of transporting them "significant", in which case 
the supplier must collect the goods at his or her own expense.92 This latter 
requirement, it may be noted, differs from the equivalent provision in the 
Sale of Goods Act, which states that the buyer is not bound to return 
rejected goods.93 The provision respecting the return of the rejected goods 
in the new Bill is essentially the same as that in the Saskatchewan 
1egislati01-1,~~ which was applied in Wagner's Flooring Ltd v Lischyn~ki .~~ 
In that case, it was held that a carpet which was found not to correspond 
with the sample by which it had been sold and the supplier had to be 
responsible for the costs of the removal of the defective carpet. 
If property in the goods has passed to the consumer before rejection, it 
revests in the supplier upon notification of the r e j e ~ t i o n . ~ ~  The consumer 
may then choose to have either a refund of goods of the same type and of 
''similar value" to replace the rejected goods if such goods are reasonably 
available to the supplier as part of his or her stock.97 The refund must be a 
refund of the cash paid or value of other consideration provided by the 
consumer; permission to acquire other goods from the supplier is not 
s ~ f f i c i e n t . ~ ~  The guarantees provided by the Bill are then applicable to the 
replacement goods.99 
87 C1 18(2)(b). 
88 C1 21 provides that a failure is of a substantial character where (a) the goods would not have 
been acquired by a reasonable consumer fully acquainted with the nature and extent of the 
failure or (b) the goods depart in one or more significant respect from their description or any 
sample or demonstration model or (c) the goods are substantially unfit for a purpose for which 
goods of the type in question are commonly supplied or a a particular purpose made known to 
the supplier or represented by the supplier to be a purpose for which the goods would be fit or 
(d) the goods are not of acceptable quality because they are unsafe. 
89 C1 18(3)(a), (b). 
90 (1990) 79 Sask R 219. 
91 c1 22(1). 
92 c 1  22(2). 
93 S 3 8 .  
94 S 22(2). 
95 Above. 
96 C122(3). 
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The right to reject the goods is lost if the right is not exercised within a 
reasonable time,Io0 or the goods have been disposed of by the consumer or 
have been lost or destroyed while in the possession of anyone other than 
the supplier or the supplier's agent,Io1 or if the goods were damaged by the 
consumer after delivery to the consumer for reasons not related to their 
state or condition at the time of supply,102 or the goods have been attached 
to or incorporated in any real or personal property and they cannot be 
detached or isolated without damaging them.lo3 These provisions replace 
s 37 of the Sale of Goods Act, which provides for the circumstances in 
which a buyer is deemed to have accepted goods and thereby loses any 
right of rejection. 
Certain difficulties arise with respect to this new scheme. While it is 
drafted with apparent clarity and simplicity, it is not clear that it will solve 
the problems at which it is directed, one of these being the difficulty of 
applying the distinction between conditions and warranties in contracts for 
the sale of goods. It is not immediately obvious that the introduction ofthe 
concept of a failure of a "substantial character'' will simplify the process 
of deciding whether a breach of contract is sufficiently serious to give rise 
to a right to rescind, which is still the essential question to be answered. 
The definition of a failure of a substantial character in cl 21 does not, it 
may be argued, clarify the matter greatly, for the matters mentioned there 
are related to compliance with description, fitness for purpose, and accept- 
able quality. The need to make a distinction, or draw the line, still exists, 
although the terminology is different. Where under the Sale of Goods Act 
the question was whether, as a result of examining the essentiality of term, 
it should be classified as a condition or a warranty, under the new Bill, the 
question will be, in the case where a statutory guarantee has not been 
complied with, whether the failure to comply is or is not of a substantial 
character. Under both pieces of legislation, different consequences flow 
from the making of the distinction and the factors to be examined may 
prove to be, in practice, very similar as far as remedies in the context of 
sales of goods are concerned. In Nestman v M t% H Electrical Contractors 
Ltdlo4 the court considered whether or not a defect in goods which had cost 
$4,704.75 was remediable or whether it constituted a substantial breach 
and held that, because a replacement part could be supplied and installed 
for a maximum of $400.00, the breach was not substantial. The issue 
remained, essentially, one of the seriousness of the breach in relation to 
the contract as a whole. 
A further difficulty which may arise is that, while the new guarantees 
replace certain provisions of the Sale of Goods Act, that Act remains intact 
so far as the law pertaining to the sale of goods is concerned, except for 
those sections which are expressed to be no longer applicable to the supply 
of goods to consumers. Consequently, the remedies available to sellers of 
goods are still determined by the Sale of Goods Act. In consequence, a 
seller may bring an action for, for example, non-acceptance of goods 
against a consumer, and the consumer's defence may arise from an 
allegation that a guarantee under the new Bill has not been complied with 





104 (1987) 50 Sask R 233 
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to whether it is the seller or the consumer who wishes to cancel the contract 
for the supply of goods; in the former case, the Sale of Goods Act will set 
out the law respecting cancellation, and in the latter case, it will be the new 
Bill which sets the rules. 
As far as the supply of services is concerned, the remedies available for 
failure to comply with a guarantee under the Bill are broadly similar to 
those which apply to the supply of goods. If a service supplied to a 
consumer fails to comply with a statutory guarantee, the consumer may, 
if the failure can be remedied, require the supplier to remedy it within a 
reasonable time105 and if the supplier refuses or neglects to do so, or does 
not do so within a reasonable time, the consumer may have the failure 
remedied elsewhere and recover the cost from the supplier or cancel the 
contract, although there is no right to cancel in a case where the service to 
be supplied under the contract is merely incidental to the supply of goods 
if the consumer had the right to reject the goods where the goods did not 
comply with the guarantees in the Bi11.Io6 If the failure cannot be remedied 
or is of a substantial character107 the consumer may cancel the contract 
(although this is subject to the limitation mentioned above if the service is 
merely incidental to the supply of goods) or obtain damages from the 
supplier in compensation for any reduction in value of the product of a 
service below the purchase price.los 
The rules applicable to cancellation are set out in cl36, which provides 
that the consumer's cancellation ofthe contracts shall not take effect before 
the time at which the cancellation is made known to the supplier or, where 
it is not reasonably practicable to communicate with the supplier, before 
the consumer indicates by means which are reasonable in the circum- 
stances, his or her intention to cancel. No particular form of cancellation 
is required, provided the intention to cancel is made known. This provision 
is essentially the same in its terms to the rules set out in s 8(1) of the 
Contractual Remedies Act. 
Clause 3 7 sets out the effects of cancellation. Where a consumer cancels 
a contract for the supply of services under the Bill, he or she is entitled to 
recover a refund of any money paid or consideration provided in respect 
of the services and, so far as the contract has been performed at the time 
of cancellation, no party is divested of any property unless a court or 
Disputes Tribunal orders otherwise. So far as the contract remains unper- 
formed at the time of cancellation, no party is obliged or entitled to perform 
it further.Iog However, nothing in those provisions is to affect the right of 
a party to recover damages in respect of a misrepresentation or the 
repudiation or breach of the contract by another party, or the right of the 
consumer to recover damages for failure to comply with a guarantee or the 
right of the consumer to reject goods supplied in connection with the 
10s C132(a)(i). 
106 C1 32(a)(ii), c134. 
107 A failure is of a substantial character where the services would not have been acquired by a 
reasonable consumer fully acquainted with the nature and extent of the failure or (b) the product 
of the service is substantially unfit for a purpose for which services of the type in question are 
commonly supplied or a product of the service is unfit for a particular purpose, or is of such a 
nature and quality that the product of the service cannot be expected to achieve any particular 
result made known to the supplier or (c) the product of the service is unsafe. 
10s C1 32(b). 
109 C1 37(1). 
I 10 C1?7(2). 
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Where a consumer has cancelled a contract for the s u ~ ~ l v  of services 
under the Bill, ancillary powers are conferred on cou& ind Disputes 
Tribunals to grant relief.ll1 In a case where "iit is just and practicable to do 
s0"112 a court or Disputes Tribunal may make an order vesting property in 
any party to the proceedings;Il3 direct the transfer, assignment or giving of 
possession of property by one party to another;lI4 direct the payment of such 
sum of money by one party to another as the court or Tribunal thinks fit;Il5 
direct any party to do or refrain from doing in relation to any other party 
any act or thing as the court or Tribunal thinks just;Il6 or permit a supplier 
to retain the whole or  art ofanv monev   aid or other consideration ~rovided 
under the contract.li7 Any skch o r i k  may be made on any 'terms or 
conditions the court or Tribunal thinks fit, provided it does not have the 
effect of preventing a claim for damages by any party.Il8 In considering 
whether to make an order, and the terms of it, the court or Tribunal is 
required to have regard to such matters as any benefit or advantage obtained 
by the consumer by reason of the supply of the the value of any 
work or services performed by the supplier in relation to the supply of the 
service;120 any expenditure incurred by the consumer or the supplier in or 
for the purpose of supplying the service;lZ1 the extent to which the supplier 
or the consumer would have been able to perform the contract in whole or 
in part;122 and such other matters as the court or Tribunal thinks fit.Iz3 An 
application for an order under cl. 38 may be made not only by the consumer 
or supplier, but by any person claiming through or under the consumer or 
the supplier124 or any other person if it is material for him or her to know 
whether relief will be However. orders mav not be made which 
would have the effect $depriving a personinot being iparty to the contract, 
of the possession of or any estate or interest in any property acquired by 
him or her in good faith and for valuable consi~deration.lZ6 Presumably, this 
provision is not intended to affect the nemo dat rules set out in the Sale of 
Goods Act, but is intended to preserve the rights which have been acquired 
by innocent third parties pursuant to those rules as well as the rights of bona 
fide third parties generally. There is also a prohibition on the making of an 
order under cl38 if any party to the contract has so altered his or her position 
in relation to the property, whether before or after the cancellation of the 
contract, that, having regard to~al l  relevant circumstances, it would be 
inequitable to any party to make such an order.127 This provision appears to 
constitute a general statement of the principle of estoppel, although there is 
no express requirement that the party who alters his or her position must 
have done so in reliance on any representation or conduct of the other party. 
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It may be, however, that it would not be inequitable to make an order under 
c l38 unless the alteration of position had been in fact caused by the other 
party to the contract. 
With respect to the matters relating to the supply of services to consum- 
ers under the new Bill, the remedies set out in the Contractual Remedies 
Act are no longer app1i~able. l~~ That Act governs the law relating to 
remedies available generally in contracts in New Zealand except for 
contracts for the sale of goods and created a broad and flexible regime with 
respect to remedies and gave wide discretionary powers to the courts to 
make orders in the event of cancellation of contracts for misrepresentation, 
repudiation or breach. The legislation codified the law relating to the 
method and effects of cancellation of contracts. 
Certain difficulties have arisen in the past as a consequence of the fact 
that the provisions of the Contractual Remedies Act respecting the cancel- 
lation of contracts are not applicable to contracts for the sale of goods. It 
has remained necessary to examine particular contracts carefully to deter- 
mine whether they are or are not contracts for the sale of goods, for 
different legal effects may occur depending on the classification of a 
contracts. In consequence, the line of cases which developed (in the days 
when contracts for the sale of goods worth over a certain amount of money 
had to be in writing) to decide whether contracts were for goods or services 
have remained of significance in New Zealand. For example, in Printcorp 
Services Ltd v Northern City Publications Ltd,129 it was necessary for the 
High Court to consider whether contracts for the printing of newspapers 
were for the supply of goods or of services because the question ofwhether 
the publisher had accepted the newspapers when they were printed and 
returned and thereby lost any right to reject them hinged on whether the 
Sale of Goods Act or the Contractual Remedies Act governed the situation. 
It was decided that the contracts were for the sale of goods, and the question 
of acceptance was accordingly decided under the Sale of Goods Act. 
No doubt the existence of the Sale of Goods Act with its clear and well 
established provisions was a good reason for excluding contracts for the 
sale of goods from the provisions of the Contractual Remedies Act at the 
time the latter act was drafted. There would have been little to be gained 
by sweeping away the longstanding and well known scheme of the Act 
and the cases interpreting it, and substituting a broad discretionary regime 
in its place. The result is that two distinct statutory schemes governing 
cancellation for misrepresentation, repudiation or breach of contracts have 
existed side by side since the passage of the Contractual Remedies Act.I3O 
Whether the introduction of yet a third scheme will assist the clarity of 
the law remains to be seen. If the new Bill is enacted, the result will be that 
those matters to which the Bill specifically relates will be dealt with under 
the Bill, but other matters which may arise from the same contract will be 
decided under different legislation. A contract for labour and materials 
may require consideration of the provisions of the new Bill if a guarantee 
is breached, of the Sale of Goods Act if, for example, a question of damages 
claimed by the seller arises, and of the Contractual Remedies Act if the 
question of misrepresentation requires determination. 
128 c1.52. 
129 [I9901 BCL 1604. 
I 30 The Law Commission has recently recommended certain amendments to both the Sale of Goods 
Act 1908 and the Contractual Remedies Act 1979 with a view to harmonising the two statutes: 
see Contract Statutes Review, Law Commission, Report No 25, Wellington, May 1993. 
Consumer law Reform: The Consumer Guarnntees Bill 3 5 
The Bill creates an inroad into the doctrine of privity by providing that 
where a consumer acquires goods from a !supplier and gives them to 
another person as a gift, that person may exercise any of the rights and 
remedies available to the original consumer against the supplier in respect 
of the guarantees relating to goods and any reference in the Part of the Bill 
concerning rights of redress against supplier!j in respect of the supply of 
goods includes a reference to the donee of the goods.131 The effect of this 
provision is that the rights against suppliers of goods run with the goods 
as long as the goods pass by way of gift frorn one person to another, for 
the donee becomes a consumer upon receipt of the goods as a gift. 
Consequently, the guarantees will remain with the recipient of the goods, 
no matter how many hands the goods have passed through, provided each 
transaction is a gift, although the chain will be broken and the rights cease 
if a sale occurs. This provision is simpler and narrower that the Saskatch- 
ewan provision on which it is based.132 The Saskatchewan legislation 
provides that the rights against suppliers are given to "persons who derive 
their property or interest in a product from or through the consumer, 
whether by purchase, gift, operation of law or otherwise, shall, regardless 
of their place in the sequence of dealings wit11 respect to the product'' be 
deemed to be given the statutory warranties, although a retail seller who 
acquires a product from a consumer for the purposes of resale or use in a 
business is excluded from the ~ 1 a s s . l ~ ~  It is interesting that the New Zealand 
provision confines the extension of rights to those who were not parties to 
the original contract to donees. The effect of this may prove to be 
unnecessarily limiting, for a person who acquires goods for the purpose of 
resale or use in trade is not, in any event, a consumer and would therefore 
acquire no rights under the Act to pass on to a donee. However, a person 
who acquires, for example, goods for domestic use, with no intention of 
reselling them, but later finds them unsuitable and agrees to sell them or 
exchange them with a neighbour, will thereby break off any liability of the 
original supplier under the guarantees. The neighbour taking the goods 
would have no rights against the supplier. 
V. RIGHTS OF REDRESS AGATNST MANUFACTURERS IN ESPECT OF 
SUPPLY OF GOODS 
The rights given by the Bill to consumers to take action directly against 
manufacturers are novel provisions in New Zealand law. Until now, the 
options available to purchasers of goods against manufacturers have been 
limited because of the doctrine of privity of contract. A purchaser who 
discovers defects in goods after their purchase generally takes action against 
the seller under the Sale of Goods Act and, bec:ause the buyer and seller are 
the parties to the contract, a remedy is available. However, this may prove 
to be of little value if the seller has, for example, become insolvent since 
selling the goods. In such a case, a purchaser might have a remedy in tort 
against the manufacturer,134 although where no physical damage has oc- 
curred, this is more problematic. In certain cases, it might be possible to 
argue that a seller is selling goods in the capacity of an agent of the 
131 c124. 
132 Consumer Products Warranties Act (Sask), s 4 
133 s 4(2). 
134 see: for example, Grant v Australian Knitting Mills Ltd [I9361 AC 85; Milne Construction Ltd 
v Expandite Ltd [I9841 2 NZLR 163. 
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manufacturer; or that a manufacturer's express guarantee constitutes a 
collateral warranty; or there may be a breach of some other statute such as 
the Fair Trading Act involved. However, if the case is the simple one of, for 
example, goods purchased from a retailer not being of merchantable quality, 
a direct right against the manufacturer might well prove impossible to find. 
The Bill gives the consumer a right of redress against the manufacturer 
of goods where the goods fail to comply with the guarantees of acceptable 
of correspondence with description due to the failure of the 
goods to correspond with any description applied to the goods by or on 
behalf of the manufacturer or with the express or implied consent of the 
rnan~facturer; '~~ and as to repairs and parts.13' There is, however, no right 
of redress against the manufacturer if the goods are not of acceptable 
quality because of any act or default or representation made by any third 
person, or a cause independent of human control, occurring after the goods 
have left the manufacturer's control, or the price charged by the supplier 
exceeding the manufacturer's recommended retail price or the average 
retail The manufacturer is also excused if the failure to correspond 
with the guarantee as to correspondence with description is cause by 
another person or a cause independent of human control, occurring after 
the goods have left the control of the man~facturer . '~~ 
Non-compliance with any express guarantee which is binding on the 
manufacturer also gives the consumer a right of redress against the 
r n a n u f a ~ t u r e r . ~ ~ ~  This right exists provided the express guarantee is given 
by the manufacturer in a document which is given to the consumer with 
the authority of the manufacturer in connection with the supply of the 
goods by a supplier to the consumer.141 In the absence of proof to the 
contrary, an express guarantee which is included in a document relating to 
goods and which appears to have been made by the manufacturer is 
presumed to have been made by the man~facturer , '~~ and similarly, there 
is a presumption that the document was given to the consumer with the 
authority of the manufacturer if it is proven that the consumer was given 
a document containing express guarantees by a manufacturer in respect of 
goods in connection with the supply of those goods to the consumer.143 
Presumably the document referred to must be separate from the goods, 
and not be simply writing attached to the goods or on the packaging. It is 
well established that the packaging of goods is part ofthe goods themselves, 
so that inadequacies in, for example, labelling, may give rise to a right of 
action on the part of the buyer of goods against the seller under the Sale of 
Goods and this is recognised by the Bill itself in that statements made 
on any packaging or label on the goods may be considered in deciding 










See, for example, Niblett Ltd v Confectioners' Materials Co Ltd [I9211 3 KB 387; Milne 
Construction Ltd v Ex andite Ltd, above n 134. 
C1 7(l)(h) As the 13il?imposes no obligations on the supplier in respect of a manufacturer's 
express guarantee, it a pears that the guarantee must be a document accompanying the goods, 
rather than be part of i e  goods themselves. 
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Where goods do not comply with a guarantee which is binding on the 
manufacturer, the consumer is entitled to damages from the manufacturer 
for any reduction in the value of the goods below the purchase price or the 
average retail price, whichever is the 10wer. l~~ However, if a manufac- 
turer's express guarantee entitles the consumer to require the manufacturer 
to remedy the failure by repairing or replacing the goods, the consumer is 
not entitled to claim such damages unless the consumer has first required 
the manufacturer to remedy the failure in this way and the manufacturer 
has refused or neglected to do so, or has not succeeded in doing so within 
a reasonable time.147 
The effect of these provisions is that the consumer's rights against the 
manufacturer are limited to damages in the absence of an express guarantee 
given by the manufacturer that goods will be repaired or replaced. In this 
respect, the rights against the manufacturer are considerably more limited 
than those which exist as against the supplier, but are appropriate for the 
situation in which the parties, being manufacturer and consumer, in many 
cases will have no direct dealings with each other and will have no 
contractual relationship. 
The rights of redress against manufacturers run with the goods as do the 
rights against suppliers, but, with respect to manufacturers, the rights of 
redress are not limited to recipients of the goods as gifts as is the case with 
suppliers. Where a consumer has a right of redress against a manufacturer, 
any person who acquires the goods from or through the consumer will have 
the same right to claim damages from the manufacturer or enforce an 
express guarantee given by the manufa~turer. '~~ Consequently, if the 
consumer sells the goods to another person, that person will have a right 
of redress against the manufacturer and that will be so even if the buyer is 
a retailer or acquires the goods for resale or for use in a business. This 
appears to be somewhat anomalous, for the Bill confers no rights as 
between the manufacturer and supplier of goods if the supplier obtains the 
goods directly from the manufacturer. If, however, a supplier were to sell 
such goods to a consumer and then buy them back from the consumer, the 
rights of redress given by the Bill against manufacturers would be available 
to the original supplier, for the supplier would be a person who acquired 
the goods from or through a consumer. In such a situation, the first sale 
between the manufacturer and the supplier would be dealt with under the 
Sale of Goods Act if the goods proved, for example, to be defective; but 
after the reacquisition ofthe goods from the consumer, the original supplier 
would rely on the rights of redress given by the new Bill as well as, 
presumably, any other rights which might be available at common law. 
The conferral of rights against manufacturers is to be welcomed, and 
should obviate the necessity to rely on the causes of action mentioned 
above, some of which, such as the concept of a collateral warranty, require 
a degree of artificiality in their analysis. This aspect of the new legislation 
represents a further significant erosion in the doctrine of privity of contract 
in New Zealand. 
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VI. CONSEQUENTIAL LOSS 
In addition to the remedies available against suppliers for failure to 
comply with the statutory guarantees, the Bill confers on consumers the 
right to obtain from the supplier of goods or services damages for any loss 
or damage to the consumer resulting from the failure (other than loss or 
damage through reduction in value of the goods or the product of the 
service) which was reasonably foreseeable as liable to result from the 
f a i 1 ~ r e . I ~ ~  A similar right of redress is available to the consumer or any 
person who acquires goods from or through the consumer against the 
manufacturer of goods which fail to meet the guarantees imposed on 
manufact~rers l~~ so that the class of possible plaintiffs is broad. The 
liability imposed on suppliers and manufacturers for losses other than the 
value of the goods or products of services is also extensive, for the 
provisions appear to be drafted widely enough to cover consequential loss 
of the kind which would normally be recoverable in both contract and tort. 
In contract, the question of remoteness of damage has of course long 
been established in general terms in the rules stated in Hadley v Baxen- 
dale. I5 l  It was stated in that case, that damages should be such as may fairly 
and reasonably be considered arising naturally, according to the usual 
course of things, from the breach, or such as may reasonably have been 
supposed to have contemplated by the parties as the probable result of the 
breach. This first limb of this principle is essentially that stated in s 54(2) 
of the Sale of Goods Act, and s 55 preserves the second limb.152 In addition, 
any special knowledge which the parties actually possess may be imported 
into both limbs.153 The familiar concept of reasonable foreseeability found 
in the law of tort may not in fact give rise to different results in examining 
the question of damages recoverable when the damage is consequent upon 
a breach of contract; it has been suggested that, at least in a case where 
both parties to a contract have the same actual or imputed knowledge, the 
am.ount of damages recoverable ought not to depend on whether the 
plaintiffs cause of action is breach of contract or tort.154 However, it has 
been pointed out that one significant difference between contract and tort 
is that, in contract, a party wishing to protect himself or herself from the 
assumption of a risk which might appear unusual can direct the attention 
of the other party to that risk and thereby affect the incidence of liability. 
In tort, however, no such opportunity for protection exists, and the tortfea- 
sor cannot complain if he is liable for some unusual, but nevertheless 
foreseeable, damage resulting from the commission of the tort.155 Strictly 
speaking, the inquiry in the case of contract is into the actual or imputed 
contemplation of the parties rather than into the question of remoteness, a 
concept which is more appropriate in the field of tort because of the 
different relationship which exists between the parties.156 However, the 
149 C1 18(4), c132(c). 
I50 C127(l)(b). 
151 (1 854) 9 Exch 341. However, the value ofHadleyvBaxenda1e may be confinedto the distinction 
drawn in it between the usual course of things and communicated special circumstances. In 
McElroy Milne v Commercial Electronics Ltd [I9931 1 NZLR 39 the Court of Appeal observed 
that on the question ofremoteness of damages, the case was neither "classic authority" (at 42, 
per Cooke P) nor "Holy Writ or statute" (at 45 per Hardie Boys J). 
152 H Parsons Livestock) Ltd v Uttley Ingham & Co Ltd [I9781 QB 791, per Lord Scarman at 807. 
153 See Victoria Laundry (Windsor) Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd [1949] 2 KB 528. 
154 H Parsons (Livestock) Ltd v Uttley Ingham & Co Ltd, above n 152. 
155 The Heron 11 [I  9691 1 AC 350,386, per Lord Reid. 
156 Ibid, at 41 1, per Lord Hodson. 
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Court of Appeal has indicated that whether there is any true difference in 
the tests to be applied in cases of contract and tort with respect to damages 
remains obscure, and the question cannot be answered with any certainty. 
The phrase "reasonably foreseeable as liable to result"157 which is used 
in the new Bill perhaps represents a combination of the concepts used in 
contract and tort. "Reasonably foreseeable" is, of course, the language of 
tort but it is found in contract as well; in McElroy Milne v Commercial 
Electronics Ltd [I9931 1 NZLR 39 the Court of Appeal took the view that 
"reasonable foresight" and "reasonable contemp1ation"appeared to be 
interchangeable terms which would provide a proper and sufficient test in 
most cases concerning the remoteness of damages in contract. "Liable to 
result" is one of the several such expressions discussed by the courts in 
their considerations of the question of damages recoverable in contract, 
examples of other such phrases being "on the cards", "not unlikely to 
occur", "likely to result, or at least not unlikely to result", or that a "real 
danger" or "serious possibility" of an occurrence existed.158 In The Heron 
IILord Reid took exception to the phrase "liable to result"; he considered 
"liable" to be "a very vague word", but went on to say that it could 
usually be said that "when a person foresees a very improbable result, he 
foresees that it is liable to happen".159 
In Saskatchewan, damage which was reasonably foreseeable as liable 
to result from failure to comply with the statutory warranties has been held 
to include, in the case of a car sold in breach of the warranties of fitness 
for purpose and of durability, the plaintiffs lost income when he lost a 
customer as a result of being late for work, taxi fares and the expense of 
hotel accommodation when the plaintiff had to stay overnight away from 
home when the vehicle in question broke down. 160 Out of pocket expenses 
for trips to a garage as well as increased the increased fuel costs in running 
a substitute vehicle have also been held to be recoverable.161 However, a 
consumer who took out bank loans to purchase goods which proved to be 
insufficiently durable and not of acceptable quality as well as for replace- 
ment goods was held not to be entitled to the interest on the 10ans.I~~ 
The above examples are of the kind which would normally be recover- 
able for breach of contract. However, the provision that damages are 
recoverable for any loss or damage resulting from a failure to comply with 
a guarantee which was reasonably foreseeable as liable to result from the 
failure is wide enough to encompass the case where defective goods or a 
product of a service cause damage to other property of the person who 
acquires the goods or product ofthe service. The kinds of difficulties which 
might arise in this area, and the significance of the distinction between 
physical loss or damage and loss which is purely economic are questions 
which have been discussed by the courts in the past. In the recent signifi- 
cant case of Murphy v Brentwood District Council163 it was said that a 
dangerous defect, once known, constituted merely a defect in quality, and 
to permit recovery of what was really economic loss would give rise to an 
unacceptably wide category of claims in respect of buildings and chattels 
157 The same phrase is used in s 20 of the Saskatchewan Act. 
158 See Lord Reid's judgment in The Heron IZ, above n 155. 
159 Ibid, at 389. 
160 Adams v J &  D's Used Cars Ltd (1983) 26 Sask R 40. , ~ - - - - - - -  ~ 
161 Kitely v Ford Motor Co o f ~ a n a d a  G d  (1988) 61 Sask R 5. 
162 Paskiman v Meadow Ford Sales Ltd (1985) 35 Sask R 81. 
163 [I9911 1 AC 398. 
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which were defective in quality, thereby introducing product liability and 
transmissible warranties of quality into the law of tort by means ofjudicial 
legislation. The new Bill, it is to be hoped, will preclude the necessity to 
consider such matters where chattels are concerned, for, where the statu- 
tory guarantees are breached by a supplier or manufacturer, any reduction 
in the value of goods or services is recoverable. There need be no contract 
between the acquirer of the goods and the manufacturer to enable the 
acquirer to bring an action directly against the manufacturer for any 
reduction in value of the goods in question. Loss or damage to other 
property, which would have been recoverable in any event under the usual 
principles of the law of negligence, may be claimed under the provisions 
of the Bill which deal with consequential loss. There will, it is to be hoped, 
be no necessity to evaluate whether loss or damage caused by a failure to 
comply with a guarantee is to the goods themselves or to other property in 
the case of defective goods which form part of a complex structure and 
cause damage to other parts of the structure,164 for, regardless of whether 
the damaged property is classified as "other" or not, the result should be 
the same under the Bill as a result of the direct right of redress against 
manufacturers conferred by its provisions. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The new Bill will have far reaching effects on New Zealand law. The 
provisions which impose obligations on manufacturers and enable direct 
rights of action against manufacturers to proceed for breach of those 
obligations are likely to clarify and simplify the law significantly in the 
area of product liability and to strengthen the position of consumers. 
Reform of the law in this important field has been long overdue. 
The guarantees imposed on suppliers, however, may give rise to diffi- 
culties, particularly when the relationship between the Bill and other 
legislation which affect the same subject matter falls to be considered by 
the courts. Much of the legislation replaces long established law, such as 
the conditions provided under the Sale of Goods Act, and the position may 
be further complicated by the fact that the replacement affects only 
consumer transactions. Only time and the experience of the operation in 
practice of the new legislation will tell. 
164 See the discussions in Murphy and Aswan Engineering Establishment Co v Lupdine Ltd [I9871 
1 All ER 135 on these points. 
